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ABSTRACT
In Lenz v. Universal, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California ruled that copyright holders must
consider fair use before filing takedown notices for infringing
content posted on the internet. In the case, Stephanie Lenz uploaded
a home video to YouTube of her children dancing to Prince's song
"Let's Go Crazy.” In response, Universal Music Corporation
submitted a takedown notice to YouTube pursuant to the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), claiming that Lenz's home
video violated its copyright in the song. Lenz claimed fair use of the
copyrighted material and sued Universal for misrepresentation of a
DMCA claim. In a decision rejecting a motion to dismiss the claim,
the District Court held that Universal must consider fair use before
filing a takedown notice, but noted that in order to prevail on a
misrepresentation claim, a claimant would need to show bad faith
by the copyright holder who filed the takedown notice. On
September 14, 2015, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court.
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion could have long-lasting effects on fair
use and how copyright holders submit DMCA takedown notices.
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INTRODUCTION
Websites consisting of user-generated content allow users to
upload material that they create. Sometimes user-generated content
can contain elements of copyrighted works.1 Common examples
include copyrighted music playing in the background of a blog or
used as a soundtrack in a home video.2 In situations like these, it is
not uncommon that user-generated content creators are unaware that
they may be violating copyright law. Thus, these creators might be
1

2

See Scott Karp, A Lot of User-Generated Content is Really User-Appropriated
Content,
PUBLISHING
2.0,
Nov.
18,
2006,
http://
publishing2.com/2006/11/18/a-lot-of-user-generated-content-is-really-userappropriated-content/.
See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151–52 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
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surprised that under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”), copyright owners may request that websites, like
YouTube, remove copyright infringing material through issuance of
a takedown notice.3 In some instances, however, user-generated
content creators’ use of a third-party work may constitute fair use,
and therefore a takedown notice would be inappropriate. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Lenz v. Universal4 now requires copyright
holders to engage in a fair use analysis before submitting a takedown
notice. In light of this ruling, user-generated content websites may
notice a decrease in the volume of takedown notice requests they
receive from alleged copyright holders.
This Article proposes that clear, objective standards be put in
place that a copyright holder must satisfy to file a takedown notice.
Part I provides background on user-generated content websites, the
DMCA, and the fair use doctrine. Part II summarizes case law in
this area and the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Lenz v. Universal. Finally,
Part III analyzes the ruling’s potential impact and proposes an
amendment to the DMCA, namely a standard form that would
ensure copyright holders adequately assess fair use before filing for
a takedown notice.
I. BACKGROUND
A. User-Generated Content
User-generated content is any type of content that has been
created and made available by unpaid contributors.5 It can refer to
pictures, videos, testimonials, tweets, blog posts, and everything in
between. Commonly used user-generated content websites include
YouTube, Facebook, and Wikipedia.6 Over the last decade,
individuals and businesses have increasingly moved their personal
and professional activity to the virtual realm. This has led to a
largely unmonitored exchange of information, products, and other
3
4
5

6

17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
Lenz, supra note 2.
Rachel Lebeaux, User-Generated Content (UGC), TECHTARGET (March,
2013),
http://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/user-generated-contentUGC.
Id.
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communications. As individuals and businesses seek avenues to
share their personal and professional endeavors on the internet,
particularly on user-generated blogs, forums, and websites, the risks
and responsibilities associated with these activities must be well
understood in order to avoid potential copyright infringements.
Unfortunately, the informal practices associated with creating,
uploading, and sharing user-generated content may leave both
copyright holders and potentially infringing content creators
wondering what exactly their rights are.
B. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The DMCA was a congressional effort attempting to balance
“the interests of content owners, service providers, and information
users in a way that will foster the continued development of
electronic commerce and the growth of the internet.”7 Congress
designed the DMCA to “enlist the cooperation of internet and other
online service providers to combat ongoing copyright
infringement.”8 As a result, the Act provides various injunctive and
monetary remedies for copyright holders who claim infringement.9
When considering injunctive relief, courts look at factors such as the
magnitude of harm the copyright holder is likely to suffer if the
material is not removed and whether an injunction is feasible,
effective, and less burdensome than other available remedies.10 In
order to seek injunctive relief under the DMCA, copyright owners
must first follow the notice and takedown provisions.11 Perhaps
most importantly, the DMCA requires a “statement that the
complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in
the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner,
its agent, or the law.”12

7
8

9
10
11
12

H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998).
Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.
2004).
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(2)(A)–(D).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
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1. Safe Harbor Provisions
To elicit compliance from service providers, the DMCA offers
a “safe harbor” provision insulating these parties from monetary
liability associated with copyright infringement activities by thirdparties.13 The DMCA safe harbor provisions define “service
provider” as “a provider of online services or network access, or the
operator of facilities therefor,” including “an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of
material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content
of the material as sent or received.”14 As one pair of commentators
has noted, this definition “would seem to encompass virtually every
internet or intranet provider or intermediary, including portal sites,
search engines, universities, and intranet providers.”15 Within this
broad definition, the DMCA safe harbor provisions distinguish
among different types of service providers based on the function
they are performing.16
Understanding the role and function of every possible entity that
could be classified as a service provider is not necessary for this
Article. However, it is important to recognize that the DMCA safe
harbor provisions cover a wide range of entities that have different
types of relationships with alleged copyright infringers. For
example, service providers responsible for hosting websites will
generally have a direct subscription relationship with alleged
infringers. Search engines, however, often lack any direct
relationship with parties responsible for posting allegedly infringing
materials. Recognizing these distinctions is essential to properly
analyzing the application of the DMCA safe harbor provisions.
In order to claim protection under the DMCA’s safe harbor

13
14
15

16

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1).
Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability
Hurricane: The Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295, 303–04 (2002).
17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d).
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provision, content hosts must meet at least three requirements.17
First, the service provider must have “adopted and reasonably
implemented . . . a policy that provides for the termination in
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the
service provider's system or network who are repeat infringers.”18
Second, the service provider must have informed “subscribers and
account holders of the service provider's system or network” of such
policy.19 Third, such policy must accommodate and not interfere
with “standard technical measures.”20 Once these initial eligibility
requirements are fulfilled, service providers must then look to the
subsections applicable to their particular functions for additional
requirements.
2. Counter Notification Procedures
The DMCA safe harbor provisions also contain a detailed set of
counter-notification procedures.21 Section 512(g)(1) limits liability
to any party based on the service providers' “good faith” removal of
“material or activity claimed to be infringing or based on facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, regardless
of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be
infringing.”22 Section 512(g)(2) provides an exception to this
general limitation by requiring service providers to follow counternotification procedures in order to benefit from a limitation of their
liability resulting from removal of materials. Under this section, a
service provider can still be held liable for removal of “material
residing at the direction of a subscriber of the service provider on a
system or network controlled or operated by or for the service
provider” unless the service provider fulfills three requirements.23
First, the service provider must take “reasonable steps promptly to
notify the subscriber that it has removed or disabled access to the
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)–(C).
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B).
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1).
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2).
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material.”24 Second, upon receipt of a counter-notification from the
subscriber, the service provider must provide the original
complainant with a copy of the counter-notification and a warning
that it will replace the material in ten business days. 25 Finally, the
service provider must replace the material, within ten to fourteen
days after receipt of the counter-notification, unless the original
complainant notifies the service provider that it has filed “an action
seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber from engaging in
infringing activity relating to the material on the service provider's
system or network.”26
Unfortunately, the DMCA provides few explicit protections for
content creators or users. The only key provision protecting users is
17 U.S.C. §512(f), which holds a copyright owner liable for
knowingly misrepresenting an infringement claim. Accordingly, the
DMCA states that “[a]ny person who knowingly materially
misrepresents under this section—that that material or activity is
infringing… shall be liable for any damages.27
C. Fair Use Doctrine
“Fair use” is a flexible doctrine that allows for the use of
copyrighted works without permission or payment in certain,
socially beneficial instances. The Copyright Act of 1976
(“Copyright Act”) does not list types of works that qualify as fair
use; rather, it provides a framework which courts apply to the facts
of a particular case.28 First, a court will consider whether the work
at issue falls within one of the specified uses, such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, or teaching; however, this consideration
is not determinative.29 Essentially, a favored use may not qualify as
fair use and a use outside the aforementioned categories may
nevertheless be fair use. Next, courts are required to consider four
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the
24
25
26
27
28
29

17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(A).
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(B).
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C).
17 U.S.C. § 512(f)(1).
17 U.S.C. § 107
17 U.S.C. § 107(a).
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copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.30
Fair use is a notoriously challenging doctrine to apply because
the Copyright Act provides little guidance on what weight to give
the various factors. A leading case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
shows how fact-specific the analysis can be while determining
whether 2Live Crew’s rap parody version of Roy Orbison’s song
“Pretty Woman” constituted fair use.31 The U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment for the
rap group based on the unique comedic character of the work and
the quantity taken from the original song.32 On appeal, however, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the rap group’s fair
use defense based on the parody’s commercial nature and the
quantity taken from the original song.33 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed and remanded for a more
nuanced analysis.34 The Court found that a parody must borrow
from an original work in order to provide commentary and that the
amount borrowed in this case was no more than necessary.35
Because fair use is so fact-specific, it can be difficult for parties to
decide whether a potential use is considered fair use without
litigation.
II. CASE LAW
A. Leading up to Lenz
Several cases illustrate how courts have subsequently treated
§512 of the DMCA. These cases help elucidate the holding in Lenz
v. Universal.

30
31
32
33
34
35

Id.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 US 569 (1994).
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn 1991).
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992).
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 US 569 (1994).
Id.
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1. Online Policy Group v. Diebold
In Online Policy Group v. Diebold,36 the U.S. District Court of
the Northern District of California held that the copyright holder,
Diebold, Inc., had violated the DMCA by sending a false takedown
notification.37 Diebold manufactured electronic voting machines.
Prior to this suit, internal company emails expressing concerns about
security issues with the voting machines were leaked and posted on
the internet.38 Subsequently, an online newspaper used the emails in
an article criticizing Diebold.39 Diebold issued a takedown notice to
the online newspaper’s ISP, Online Policy Group (“OPG”). In
response, OPG sued Diebold for knowingly misrepresenting a
copyright infringement claim.40 Diebold never produced specific
emails that contained copyrighted content and even admitted that
some emails were publishable under fair use.41 Accordingly, the
court held that Diebold had knowingly misrepresented infringing
activity by sending the takedown notification. In its holding, the
court examined the meaning of a “knowing misrepresentation”
under §512(f): “’knowing means that a party actually knew [or]
should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or
would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith,
that it was making misrepresentations.”42 Since some emails were
“clearly subject to the fair use exception,” and Diebold had admitted
this, it was simple for the court to conclude that Diebold knew it was
misrepresenting their infringement claim.43

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal 2004).
Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1197–98.
Id. at 1198.
Online, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
Id. at 1204.
Id.
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2. Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America
Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America44 was the first
case that directly addressed the nebulous “good faith belief”
language in the DMCA. In affirming the U.S. District Court for the
District of Hawaii’s grant of summary judgment for the copyright
owner, the Ninth Circuit held that only a subjective standard, not an
objective reasonableness standard, is required to determine whether
an alleged copyright owner sufficiently examined whether issuing a
takedown notice is appropriate.45 In this case, Michael Rossi’s ISP,
responding to a takedown notification from the Motion Picture
Association of America (“MPAA”), shut down Rossi’s website.46
The MPAA believed that the site was distributing copyrighted
movies illegally because the site provided links that teased viewers
into thinking that they could view copyrighted material.47 However,
no movies were actually available to view. Rossi argued that the
MPAA “did not have sufficient information to form a good faith
belief.”48 More specifically, he asserted that the MPAA could not
have formed a good faith belief that his website was infringing
copyrighted works without clicking on and accessing the suspicious
links.49 Good faith belief, Rossi argued, should include a reasonable
investigation of the website.50
The court held that the MPAA only needed to meet a
subjective standard before sending its takedown notification for
several reasons.51 First, it determined, federal statutes use subjective
good faith and objective reasonableness as distinct standards.
Congress would not have written “good faith” in the statute if it had
meant “reasonable belief.”52 Second, the liability section of the
DMCA, §512(f), states that damages may be imposed only if the
copyright holder knowingly and materially misrepresents activities
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Rossi v. Motion Picture of Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F. 3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1001–02.
Id.
Id. at 1002.
Rossi, 391 F. 3d at 1003.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1004.
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cited in the takedown notification.53 Knowing misrepresentation
was incompatible with Rossi’s suggested reasonableness standard;
a belief could be unreasonable without being a knowing
misrepresentation that triggered liability under §512(f).54 Such a
result would render the good faith belief requirement in §512(c)
meaningless. Third, the court held that it would be unfair to make
copyright owners liable simply because an unknowing mistake is
made.55 Applying the subjective good faith standard, the Ninth
Circuit examined information on Rossi’s website and the MPAA’s
subsequent actions. Ultimately, the court ruled that Rossi failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding MPAA's violation of
the DMCA.56 The Rossi opinion concludes with a reminder that
Congress intended to protect internet users accused of infringement
from “subjectively improper actions by copyright holders.”57
3. Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment
In Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment, the U.S. District Court of
Colorado granted summary judgement for the copyright holder
MGA Entertainment (“MGA”) on the plaintiff’s knowing
misrepresentation claim.58 The plaintiffs, Karen Dudnikov and
Michael Meadors, were selling fleece hats on eBay bearing a
copyright-protected applique of a ‘Bratz’ character.59 MGA held
copyright and trademark rights in the Bratz characters and, on
discovering the plaintiff’s eBay auction, sent a notification to eBay
to have the sale stopped.60 The plaintiffs sued, claiming MGA
ignored “copyright law in an attempt to control the on-line auction
53

54
55
56
57
58
59
60

17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006) (“Any person who knowingly materially
misrepresents under this section that materially or activity is infringing…shall
be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by the
alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner’s authorized
licensee, or by a service provider.”).
Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1004–05.
Id. at 1005.
Id.
Id.
Dudnikov v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (D. Colo. 2005).
Id. at 1010.
Id.
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market.”61 They further asserted that they were entitled by fair use
and the first-sale-doctrine to sell the fleece hats.62
The court applied the subjective good-faith standard established
in Rossi,63 holding that “the Rossi decision [is] on point with regard
to the salient issue in this case: whether MGA was entitled, based
on its good-faith belief that infringement was occurring, to terminate
the eBay auction of plaintiff’s fleece hat.”64 The court ultimately
found that MGA acted with good faith and was entitled to have the
sale stopped.65 Upon, the plaintiffs’ allegation of perjury, the court
imposed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to support their claim
with “substantial evidence”66 Subsequently, the plaintiffs were
unable to raise a genuine issue of fact and lost on summary
judgment.67
B. Lenz v. Universal
In Lenz v. Universal, plaintiff Stephanie Lenz contended that her
use of Prince’s song “Let’s Go Crazy” constituted fair use and that
copyright holders cannot make a good faith infringement claim, as
required by the DMCA, “without considering all authorized uses of
the material, including fair use.”68 Lenz further declared that
copyright holders should make a fact-specific determination before
filing takedown notices.69 In opposition, Universal argued that it
should not have to evaluate fair use before submitting a takedown
notice because it would “lose the ability to respond rapidly to
potential infringements.”70 Universal additionally claimed that “fair
use is merely an excused infringement to a copyright rather than a
use authorized by a copyright owner or by law.”71
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id.
Id.
Dudnikov, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
Id. at 1017.
Id.
Id. at 1012.
Dudnikov, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1013.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
Id. at 1154–55.
Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1154.
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1. Case Facts
In 2007, Stephanie Lenz posted a twenty-nine second clip of her
children dancing to Prince’s song on YouTube.72 In response,
Universal, the copyright holder for “Let’s Go Crazy”, sent YouTube
a takedown notice, allegedly in compliance with the DMCA
requirements.73 Shortly thereafter, Lenz sent YouTube a counternotification, claiming fair use of the original work and requesting
the video be reposted.74 Six weeks later, YouTube reposted Lenz’s
video.75 Still dissatisfied with the takedown of her home video, Lenz
sued Universal for misrepresentation under the DMCA and sought
a declaration from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California that her use of the copyrighted song was noninfringing.76 According to the DMCA, the copyright holder must
consider whether use of the material was allowed by the copyright
owner or the law.77 Before YouTube removed Lenz’s video,
Universal released a statement regarding their intention to remove
all user-generated content involving Prince from the internet as a
matter of principle.78 Based on Universal’s statements, Lenz argued
that Universal was issuing takedown notices in bad faith, as they
were attempting to remove all Prince-related content rather than
considering whether each posting violated copyright law. Had
Universal truly considered whether Lenz’s video infringed on its
copyright, Lenz contended that Universal would have clearly noted
that her video was a fair use. Universal expressed concerns over
conducting an intensive investigation when determining whether a
potentially infringing use falls under the general “fair use” doctrine.
2. Lenz Court’s Reasoning

72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 1152.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
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Both parties’ main arguments can be summarized neatly.
Universal contended that copyright owners cannot be required to
evaluate the question of fair use prior to sending a takedown notice
because fair use is merely an excused infringement of a copyright
rather than a use authorized by the owner or by law. In opposition,
Lenz argued that fair use is an authorized use of copyrighted
material, noting that the fair use doctrine itself is an express
component of copyright law. In essence, Lenz asserted that
copyright owners cannot represent in good faith that material
infringes a copyright without considering all authorized uses of the
material, including fair use.
The parties did not dispute that Lenz used copyrighted material
in her video or whether Universal is the true owner of Prince’s
music. Rather, the question in this case was whether the DMCA
requires a copyright owner to consider the fair use doctrine in
formulating a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner
complained of is not “authorized” by the copyright owner, its agent,
or the law.79 If so, copyright holders are required to weigh the four
fair use factors, or else they are liable for misrepresentation.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling
that copyright owners must consider fair use before submitting
DMCA takedown notices.80 In formulating their ruling, the court
used statutory interpretation to determine the scope of what is
considered “authorized.” The Copyright Act itself does not define
the term “authorize” or “unauthorized.” However, Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “authorize” as “empowers; to formally
approve.”81 As such, the court determined that “[b]ecause [the
Copyright Act] both ‘empowers’ and ‘formally approves’ the use of
copyrighted material if the use constitutes fair use, fair use is
considered to be ‘authorized by law’ within the meaning of §512(c)”
of the DMCA.”82 The court held that the DMCA already required
copyright holders to make an initial review of the potentially
infringing material prior to sending a takedown notice, and that it
would be impossible to meet any of the requirements of §512(c)
79
80
81
82

17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 2015).
Authorize, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Lenz, 801 F.3d at 1132.
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without doing so.83 Considering the applicability of the fair use
doctrine is a part of that initial review.84 In order to comply with the
DMCA, a copyright holder’s consideration of fair use need not be
searching or intensive.85 The court stated that it was mindful of the
work this presents, but that work “does not excuse a failure to
comply with the procedures outlined by Congress.”86 Moreover, the
court noted that the implementation of computer algorithms to
notify copyright owners of potential infringements online appears to
be a valid and good-faith middle ground for processing a plethora of
content while still meeting the DMCA’s requirements to somehow
consider fair use.87 Computer programs may be relied upon when
they sufficiently meet the following standards: “(1) the video track
matches the video track of a copyrighted work submitted by a
content owner; (2) the audio track matched the audio track of that
same copyrighted work; or (3) nearly the entirety….is comprised of
a single copyrighted work.”88
III. LENZ’S IMPACT AND AMENDING THE DMCA
A. A Step in the Right Direction
The DMCA’s safe harbor provisions arguably incentivizes
overzealous removal of user-generated content by service providers.
Under the notice and takedown procedures, if a service provider
receives notification from a copyright owner alleging copyright
infringement, it can initially take one of two actions. The provider
can elect to remove or disable access to the allegedly infringing
content. If it does so, it is protected from contributory liability by
the safe harbor provisions.89 Alternatively, a service provider can
83
84
85

86
87
88

89

Id at 1135.
Id.
See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir.
2004).
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. (citing Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/fr/pages/fair-useprinciples-user-generated-video-content (last visited April 28, 2017)).
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1).
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refuse to remove or disable access, in which case it is unprotected
by the safe harbor provisions and opens itself up to potential
secondary liability. In weighing the merits of a takedown notice
complaint and determining whether to provide an alleged copyright
holder with relief, the service provider acts in a similar capacity to
that of a judiciary; however, unlike the courts, service providers
have a direct financial incentive tilting them in favor of removing
the allegedly infringing content.
The Lenz opinion does not change the safe harbor procedures for
service providers or host websites that receive takedown notices;
however, it may affect the quality and volume of notices received,
depending on how copyright holders and their agents adjust. Lenz v.
Universal effectively put copyright holders on notice to exert a good
faith effort in examining whether a potentially infringing work
legally uses the original work, and this good faith effort must include
a fair use analysis.
The fair use doctrine gives little guidance about what weight to
give the four factors laid out in the Copyright Act. Because the
doctrine is so fact-specific, it is understandably difficult for
copyright owners with little to no legal background to meet this
expectation. Limited understanding of case law may impact the
volume of notices ISPs and host websites receive. For instance, the
penalties associated with misrepresentation may cause copyright
owners to err on the side of caution and refrain from filing for
takedown notices with host websites.90 While it is too early to have
a clear picture of the impact, Lenz v. Universal will likely dissuade
frivolous takedown notices for the time being.
B. Standard-Form Proposal
In retrospect, it is easy to see how Universal could believe that
Lenz had infringed their copyrighted work. The title of Lenz’s
video, “’Let’s Go Crazy’ #1”, is nearly identical to the title of
Prince’s song. However, large corporations, like Universal, have
extensive resources that should afford them at least a cursory
investigation into potential infringement of their copyright portfolio.
If Universal was compelled to use an objective good faith standard,
90

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
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it would have quickly realized that a short video clip of a toddler
dancing to faint background music of Prince’s song does not
constitute copyright infringement. A subjective good faith standard
would make it easier for Universal and other large media-producing
corporations to issue takedown notices without pausing to consider
the content at issue.
When a copyright holder alleges infringement, courts have
applied the fair use doctrine as a guideline to decide permissible
uses.91 Likewise, Congress can integrate into the DMCA a standard
form for use by all internet service providers and user-generated
content websites, which details the fair use doctrine factors and
explicitly requires those who allege copyright infringement to
establish sufficient grounds based on the facts of their individual
case for filing a takedown notice. A standard form has the potential
to assist copyright owners in separating fair use of copyrighted
works from obvious copyright violations. Moreover, such a
framework would further curb the number of frivolous takedown
notices, protect content creators from having their work taken down,
and protect parties ranging from independent copyright owners who
lack legal aid to large corporations from being sued for
misrepresentation when filing for a DMCA takedown notice. A
sample form is provided on the following page.

91

See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 US 417
(1984); see also Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Ent., 471 US 539 (1983).
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Contact Information
Name:
Title:
Company (If applicable):

Address:
City, State, Zip Code:
Phone/ Email:

Copyrighted Work:

Infringing Content:

Relation to Copyrighted Work:
Description of Copyrighted Work:

Description of Infringing Content:

Upload Attachment(s)

Upload Attachment(s)

Fair Use Analysis
Pursuant to 17 U.S. Code § 107, the following factors must be considered when determining whether use of a
copyrighted work constitutes a fair use. Please address these factors in the space provided.
(1) The purpose and character of the use
(i.e. whether the infringing use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit purposes)

(2) The nature of the copyrighted work
(i.e. whether the infringing use is informational or entertaining)

(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole

(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work

Certification
✓ Under penalty of perjury I certify that the information contained in this notification is accurate, and I have
the authority to act on behalf of the owner of the copyright(s) involved.
__________________________
(Signature/ Date)
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CONCLUSION
Lenz v. Universal built upon precedent by effectively putting
copyright holders on notice that in order to exert a good faith effort
in examining whether a potentially infringing work legally uses the
original work, a fair use analysis must be conducted. While Lenz
represents a step in the right direction, opportunities for clarification
exist that have the potential to benefit copyright holders as well as
user-generated content creators who make use of copyrighted
material. One such opportunity is to amend the DMCA to include a
standard form that would be adopted by all ISPs and host websites.
This simple amendment would provide clarity to all parties and help
further curb the number of frivolous takedown notices.
PRACTICE POINTERS

92

▪

Copyright owners and their agents must engage in a fair use
analysis before submitting a takedown notice.

▪

Computer algorithms used to notify copyright owners of
potential infringements online are a valid and good-faith
mechanism for meeting the DMCA’s requirements. Such
programs may be relied upon when they sufficiently meet
the following standards: “(1) the video track matches the
video track of a copyrighted work submitted by a content
owner; (2) the audio track matched the audio track of that
same copyrighted work; or (3) nearly the entirety….is
comprised of a single copyrighted work.”92

▪

Lenz. v. Universal does not change the safe harbor
procedures for service providers or host websites that receive
takedown notices.

Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing
Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/fr/pages/fair-use-principlesuser-generated-video-content (last visited April 28, 2017)).

